Cyber Sabotage and Geopolitical Escalation: The Implications of Israel’s Alleged Role in Lebanon’s Pager and Walkie-Talkie Explosions
On September 17, 2024, Lebanon was rocked by a series of explosions as thousands of pagers carried by Hezbollah members detonated, causing widespread destruction and panic. Many pointed fingers at Israel—a State with a long history of using cyber warfare and covert sabotage to neutralize its adversaries in the Middle East; a tactic most famously demonstrated in the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program. As the world tried to make sense of this unusual and highly coordinated attack, a second wave of explosions followed the next day also in Lebanon, this time targeting walkie-talkies used by the militant group.
Since then, Hezbollah declared and ‘open-ended battle’ with Israel, firing over 100 rockets into Israel on Sunday, September 22. On Monday, Israel responded with air strikes on Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon, killing 492 people, according to the Lebanese health ministry. This escalation marks the deadliest cross-border attack not only since war erupted in Gaza on October 7, but also in almost 20 years.
TWC Insight: While Israel remains silent on the matter, these back-to-back explosions have raised significant geopolitical tensions in the region and reveal how cybersecurity, supply chain infiltration, and geopolitics are increasingly intertwined in modern conflict. Let’s navigate.
Stuxnet Echo in Lebanon
At the heart of the September incidents there is the use of low-tech devices (the pagers and walkie-talkies) as the delivery mechanism for detonating explosives. Though they may seem outdated in some parts of the world, Hezbollah heavily favored analog devices for their perceived immunity to modern digital surveillance. It was believed that their low-tech nature provided them free protection from modern intelligence operations, unlike cellphones and computers which can be easily hacked, tracked and surveilled.
Yet, history has shown otherwise: low-tech devices can be compromised. Coincidentally, the most notable example about this is a previous covert operation by Israel. Stuxnet was a computer worm launched in 2010, developed in collaboration with the United States, that targeted Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, devices that are not connected to the internet or any other network, and caused physical destruction without requiring traditional military intervention.
The September explosions in Lebanon bear striking similarities to Stuxnet, aligning with Israel’s broader strategy of using cyber sabotage to preemptively strike at enemies before they become too powerful. In 2024, Israel might allegedly be targeting outdated Hezbollah devices to disrupt their communication networks and cause lasting damage to its command-and-control structures. The goal, again, appears to be an attempt to neutralize a significant threat without direct military conflict, while demonstrating to the world that no device, no matter how low-tech, is safe from cyber-physical sabotage.
Is there a New Phase in Cyber-Physical Warfare?
Absolutely. In two big ways. To get there, let’s take a step back.
While the pager and walkie-talkie explosions represent another instance of cyber-physical warfare, where digital and physical methods are combined to weaken adversaries, the specifics of this attack push the boundaries of what we’ve seen before.
How did it happen? Well, explosives were likely planted within the devices during their production or distribution process -a supply chain infiltration that requires advanced technical knowledge. Then, there was a waiting period. The perpetrators had to have a reasonable excuse to trigger the explosives -presumably remotely, possibly via a coded message or signal- once the comms devices were in Hezbollah’s possession. Undoubtably, the degree of careful planning involved into monitoring who is in possession of the tampered devices -which included Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon- and when to detonate them is very, very high.
However, the September 2024 incident pushes cyber-physical warfare into new territory. Why, might you ask?
While the context is highly relevant of course (it happened in the middle of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which seems to be expanding into Lebanon -where Hezbollah originated, is based and is becoming more and more involved in said conflict), the implications it has for the cyber realm are outstanding: escalating a cyber incident into physical warfare: the death of at least 37 people – including two children – and wounding of at least 2,900 others, clearly trespasses the threshold of previous cyber-physical sabotage efforts that were mere annoyances from one country enough to stall another’s nuclear program or ransoming IT equipment or some other petty situation.
Yes, it could be said that there are casualties in war, even if cyber warfare is a variable involved in conflict. But there is contention into questioning if the incident can be considered a just act of war; indeed, UN’s OHCHR condemned the malicious manipulation and qualified is as “terrifying” violations of international law; and it is all due to the fact on how cyber warfare is evolving.
Now back to the context, there is no surprise that Hamas’ leadership has said the acts go against all conventions and laws and considered them an act of war. The wider ramifications for the Middle East region remain unclear. Could this conflict trigger a larger war between Israel and Hezbollah’s backers, including Iran? Remains to be seen.
For the moment, the September 2024 incident should be considered a highly focused and coordinated cyber-physical attack. Although, not in the same way as Stuxnet was an “attack”. There is, quite evidently clear, a difference in degree and type of physical damage.
Moreover, this type of cyber-physical attack also unprecedented because of a new significant vulnerability has been exposed, as a very alarming threat: the sabotaging of the supply chain with the purpose of causing physical harm to a targeted large group of people. In other words, Israel’s alleged operation has revealed that global supply chains can be exploited to terrible effects, blurring the lines between cyberattacks and kinetic warfare as we know it.
Extension of the Cyber World: the Supply Chain Vulnerability
With the successful coordination of detonating devices suggesting an advanced infiltration of the global supply chain, it has become a major vulnerability in modern warfare. The pagers and walkie-talkies Hezbollah received have been traced back to manufacturers in Taiwan, Hungary, and possibly Bulgaria and Norway, showcasing the complexity of international supply chains, which often span multiple countries and different types of organizations, but also their susceptibility to be compromised, infiltrated and exploited. The perpetrators likely inserted explosives during production or distribution, making it almost impossible for Hezbollah to detect the tampering until it was too late.
This points to a critical issue: cybersecurity today must go beyond protecting data, fixing zero-day issues and comliance. It must now encompass securing hardware from production to deployment -whether it is tampered hardware, or compromised software. Governments and private enterprises alike must consider how exposed their supply chains are to similar sabotage. While this Israel’s alleged operation in Lebanon was aimed at a militant group, the broader implications for global security are clear. Supply chain sabotage poses risks not only to military operations but also to civilian infrastructure worldwide, especially if the sabotage’s aim is to injure people or take lives.
A New Battlefield
The September 2024 pager and walkie-talkie explosions in Lebanon serve as a stark illustration of how cyber-physical warfare is reshaping itself and the battlefield. These attacks demonstrate that the lines between cyber-attacks and kinetic warfare are becoming increasingly blurred. What was once considered a cyber realm, focused on data and digital assets, has now expanded to include physical sabotage, with terrible lethal consequences.
As supply chains become more globalized and complex, they are also more vulnerable to manipulation. The success of this operation—if attributed to Israel—proves that even low-tech devices can be weaponized through cyber-physical means. For Hezbollah and other actors in the region, the realization that no technology is safe from sabotage will surely force a reassessment of their security strategies.
As the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah intensifies, the potential for this type of cyber-physical warfare to escalate further is a critical concern, even by other actors in other parts of the world. The question is no longer whether cyber-physical sabotage will play a role in modern conflicts, but how far it will go and what the global ramifications will be.
