The U.S. vs. Google (II): Between a Historic Ruling and the Risk of Regulatory Simulation
The original version of this analysis was published on April 21, 2025 in Nexos digital magazine’s section “The Supreme Court Game” in Spanish. This version has been translated to English with help of ChatGPT 4o
When we published the first part of this analysis, the trial against Google was just beginning: an antitrust case filed by the U.S. Department of Justice that aimed to be the most significant since the breakup of AT&T in 1982. On April 17, 2025, the Department of Justice released an official statement celebrating its legal victory in the case United States v. Google, describing it as a historic ruling that “restores competition and opens the search market to new options.”
This ruling, issued by federal judge Amit Mehta and currently in the process of being implemented, makes it clear that this is not merely a legal dispute: it is a battle to define who governs the digital architecture of the 21st century.
A precedent-setting ruling… but not yet enough
On March 7, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued its final judgment in the case United States v. Google LLC (No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM), approving a series of structural measures to limit the company’s anticompetitive practices. In particular, the ruling prohibits Google from tying the installation of its search engine to licenses for other key products, such as Chrome, Gemini, or Google Play:
“Google shall not condition the license of Google Play or any other Google-controlled application—including Google Search, Chrome, Assistant, or Gemini—on the preinstallation or default status of its search engine on mobile devices sold in the United States.” (Final Judgment, Section III.A)
The court also establishes specific restrictions on contracts with manufacturers such as Apple, Mozilla, Samsung, or AT&T, which have historically served to secure Google’s position as the default search engine on browsers, phones, and operating systems. This architecture of “default” agreements, according to the DOJ, amounts to “closing the market to competition before it can emerge.”
Structural separation? Google proposes a different path
In early March, the company held meetings with officials from the U.S. Department of Justice, urging them to reconsider any measures that would involve its breakup. Google argued that such actions could harm the U.S. economy and compromise national security. And those efforts, it seems, had an effect in the company’s favor, as the ruling does not immediately order the sale of assets—although it does impose compliance conditions that could lead to harsher penalties if the company fails to cooperate.
Among the measures proposed by Google to expand competition in the search engine market are: allowing users to actively choose their default search engine, displaying competitors in configuration settings, and maintaining transparency in its contracts. But the government responded that these actions are too little, too late, and insufficient to reverse more than a decade of exclusionary behavior. In the words of the prosecutors:
“Google’s conduct has substantially and durably harmed the competitive structure of the search market. Conditions will not change without drastic intervention.” (DOJ Response, March 2025)
The political game: a White House that backs and protects
Legally, the Trump administration has continued the case initiated under Biden. But politically and economically, it has made decisions that sharply contrast with that narrative. In January, the president signed Executive Order 14179, which repeals previous restrictions on artificial intelligence and promotes an environment “free of ideological bias” for its development. In addition, the White House has offered strategic support to companies like Meta and Amazon in the face of European regulations, aiming to safeguard U.S. sovereignty over its economy by preventing the unfair exploitation of American innovation (see here).
This tension between the judicial branch and the executive power reveals something deeper: the United States not only regulates its tech giants; it also protects them as geopolitical assets. And in that context, it’s worth asking whether the ruling against Google will mark the beginning of a transformation of the digital ecosystem… or merely serve as a symbolic release valve.
What’s next for Google (and for everyone else)?
The ruling establishes a clear timeline: the measures must take effect 120 days after publication and will remain in force for an initial period of three years, with the possibility of extension. During that time, Google will be subject to annual evaluations, must appoint an independent compliance officer, and submit periodic reports to the court. Any noncompliance may result in additional sanctions or the imposition of a “structural remedy” (i.e., the separation of business lines such as Chrome or Android).
But what will truly be decisive is implementation. If the DOJ fails to enforce the terms firmly, if Google delays changes through bilateral negotiations, or if the companies that benefit (such as Apple or Samsung) do not rethink their collaboration models, the ruling could become a symbolic victory with no real impact.
The trial against Google presents us with a crucial dilemma: can the State regain control over platforms that shape access to information, advertising flows, and everyday digital life? Or are we simply witnessing a new form of regulatory simulation—one where judicial decisions coexist with a political environment that continues to reward concentration?
As I’ve said before, at its core this case isn’t just about Google: it’s about power. And more than ever, what’s at stake is whether that power can be governed by law—or whether it will remain shielded by the market and political calculation.
